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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In their challenge to New Jersey’s title insurance 
regulations, Appellants would have this court disregard a 
decision of the United States Supreme Court and the 
numerous cases that have relied on it.  We are not about to do 
that.  Appellants’ efforts belong in another venue. 
 
I. 
 
Background 
  
Appellants, title insurance purchasers, on behalf of 
themselves and similarly situated consumers, appeal the 
District Court’s orders dismissing their state and federal 
antitrust claims against numerous New Jersey title insurance 
companies.  Appellants claim that the Appellee insurers 
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collectively fixed title insurance rates in violation of the 
Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust Act.  The District 
Court held that Appellants’ complaint is barred by the filed 
rate doctrine, a lack of standing, and federal and state antitrust 
liability exemptions.   
 
In New Jersey, the Department of Banking and 
Insurance (“DOBI”) approves and regulates title insurance 
rates.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:1C-19(a)(1).  Insurers may 
collectively file rates for approval with the DOBI through a 
licensed “rating organization.”  Id. § 17:46B-46.  Appellees 
are members of and file their rates through the New Jersey 
Land Title Insurance Rating Bureau (“NJTIRB”)—a 
“voluntary association of title insurers” acting under New 
Jersey law.  App. at 31, 74.  The NJLTIRB “operates, more or 
less, as a clearing house for its constituent members by 
collecting their proposed rates and supporting data and 
submitting them to the [DOBI].”  In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 
No. 08-1425, 2009 WL 3233529, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2009).  
New Jersey thus specifically “authorize[s] cooperative action 
between or among title insurance companies in rate making.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:46B-41.   
 
Once insurers submit rate filings with the DOBI, the 
Commissioner “shall make such review of the filing as may 
be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Title 
Insurance Act].”  Id. § 17:46B-42(c).  The Commissioner 
may approve the rates, id. § 17:46B-45(a), or, after holding a 
hearing, issue an order disapproving the rates, id. § 17:46B-
45(b).  Additionally, the Commissioner can only approve 
rates that “are not unreasonably high, and are not inadequate 
for the safeness and soundness of the insurer, and are not 
unfairly discriminatory.”  Id. § 17:46B-45(a).  Once the 
DOBI issues its approval, each member of the “title insurance 
rating organization shall adhere to the filings made on its 
behalf.”  Id. § 17:46B-47.  Members, however, can seek to 
modify their individual rates through a “deviation filing.”  Id.  
Moreover, aggrieved parties can challenge title insurance 
rates through an administrative hearing, after which the 
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Commissioner may deem the rates “no longer effective.”1
On September 19, 2008, Appellants filed a putative 
class action complaint, alleging that Appellees engaged in 
collective price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust Act.  Appellants 
alleged that “[t]hrough NJLTIRB, [Appellees] and their co-
conspirators have agreed upon and engaged in concerted 
efforts to (i) collectively set and charge uniform and supra-
competitive rates for title insurance and attendant services in 
New Jersey, (ii) embed within these title insurance rates 
payoffs, kickbacks, and other charges that are unrelated to the 
issuance of title insurance or the business of insurance, and 
(iii) hide these . . . ‘costs’ from regulatory scrutiny by 
funneling them to and through title agents.”  App. at 42, 44.  
Appellants sought immediate injunctive relief and treble 
damages. 
  Id. 
§ 17:46B-45(c).   
 
 The District Court dismissed Appellants’ complaint 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) but granted Appellants leave to 
amend their claims.  Specifically, the Court concluded that 
Appellants’ claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine, which 
precludes antitrust suits based on rates currently filed with 
federal or state agencies.  See In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 2009 
WL 3233529, at *3.  On November 4, 2009, Appellants filed 
a nearly identical amended complaint which the Court also 
dismissed under 12(b)(6).  See In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., No. 
08-1425, 2010 WL 2710570, at *1 (D.N.J. July 6, 2010).  The 
Court held that: (1) Appellants lack standing to seek 
injunctive relief under Article III of the Constitution and 
Section 16 of the Clayton Act; (2) Appellants’ Sherman Act 
claim is barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s antitrust 
exemption; (3) Appellants’ New Jersey Antitrust Act claim is 
                                              
1 Specifically, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:46B-45(c) provides 
that “[a]ny person or organization aggrieved with respect to 
any filing which is in effect, may make written application to 
the commissioner for a hearing thereon,” which the 
commissioner will review to determine if a hearing is 
necessary.  Id. at § 17:46B-45(c).  At oral argument, 
Appellants admitted that they have not challenged the 
Appellees’ title insurance rates in a formal administrative 
hearing.   
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barred by N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:9-5(b)(4)’s antitrust exemption; 
and (4) the subsequent amendment of Appellants’ complaint 
would be futile.  Plaintiffs appeal.   
 
II.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  This court has appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reviews de novo the 
District Court’s dismissal of Appellants’ initial and amended 
complaints.  Utilimax.com, Inc. v. PPL Energy Plus, LLC, 
378 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 2004).  In addition, we review the 
District Court’s refusal to grant Appellants leave to amend 
their final complaint for abuse of discretion.  Shane v. Fauver, 
213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).    
 
A. The Filed Rate Doctrine 
 
 Courts often trace the filed rate doctrine to Keogh v. 
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).  
In that case, a shipper alleged that certain railroad carriers 
conspired to fix freight transportation rates in violation of the 
Sherman Act.  Id. at 160-61.  The shipper sought damages 
based on the unusually high rates.  Id.  The Supreme Court, 
however, denied the shipper’s claim because the carriers had 
been authorized to charge the challenged rates by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”).  Id. at 162.  The 
Court reasoned that it would be improper to hold carriers 
civilly liable for enforcing rates that the ICC had already 
approved as legal.  Id. at 162-63.  In addition, the Court 
expressed a concern for rate discrimination, stating that the 
shipper’s potential damages “might, like a rebate, operate to 
give him a preference over his trade competitors.”  Id. at 163.  
Finally, the Court considered the impracticability of awarding 
damages based on a lower hypothetical rate, which would 
require “reconstituting the whole rate structure”— a task that 
the Court viewed the ICC as more competent to handle.  Id. at 
164 (“[I]t is the Commission which must determine whether a 
rate is discriminatory [i.e., legal]; at least, in the first 
instance.”). 
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 The filed rate doctrine stood undisturbed by the 
Supreme Court for almost three quarters of a century when 
the Court re-examined the doctrine in Square D Co. v. 
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986).  
There, various corporations alleged that the respondents 
conspired with their rate making bureau to fix freight 
transportation rates in violation of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 
410-11.  The petitioners sought treble damages based on the 
fixed rates.  Id. at 410.  They argued that “unlike Keogh, 
respondents’ rates . . . were not challenged in a formal ICC 
hearing,” thus claiming that the agency’s approval was 
insufficient to trigger the filed rate doctrine.  Id. at 417; see 
also id. at n.19.  Rejecting that argument, the Court reasoned 
that respondents’ rates were “duly submitted, lawful rates 
under the Interstate Commerce Act in the same sense that the 
rates filed in Keogh were lawful.”  Id. at 417.  Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the petitioners cannot bring a treble-
damages antitrust action.  See id. at 417, 424.  Moreover, the 
Court approvingly quoted the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
of Keogh: 
 
“Rather than limiting its holding to cases where, 
as in Keogh, rates had been investigated and 
approved by the ICC, the [Keogh] Court said 
broadly that shippers could not recover treble-
damages for overcharges whenever tariffs have 
been filed.” 
 
Id. at 417 n.19 (quoting Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier 
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1347, 1351 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
 
 This court has recognized that the filed rate doctrine 
“bars antitrust suits based on rates that have been filed and 
approved by federal agencies.”  Utilimax.com, 378 F.3d at 
306.  Other courts of appeals have also extended the doctrine 
to rates filed with state agencies.  See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd. v. 
NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[C]ourts have 
uniformly held, and we agree, that the rationales underlying 
the filed rate doctrine apply equally strongly to regulation by 
state agencies.”); H.J. Inc. v. NW. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 
494 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e see no reason to distinguish 
between rates promulgated by state and federal agencies.”).  
Moreover, although the doctrine “has its origins in . . . cases 
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interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act,” it “has been 
extended across the spectrum of regulated utilities.”  Ark. La. 
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981). 
 
Appellants argue that the filed rate doctrine does not 
preclude their antitrust claims because those claims do not 
implicate the doctrine’s underlying policies.  Although we 
have not previously outlined the policies underlying the filed 
rate doctrine, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
explained that the doctrine is designed to advance two 
“companion principles”: (1) “preventing carriers from 
engaging in price discrimination as between ratepayers,” and 
(2) “preserving the exclusive role of . . . agencies in 
approving rates . . . by keeping courts out of the rate-making 
process,” a function that “regulatory agencies are more 
competent to perform.”  Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 
58 (2d Cir. 1998).  These “companion principles” are often 
called the “nondiscrimination strand” and the 
“nonjusticiability strand.”  Id.  The “nonjusticiability strand” 
recognizes that “(1) legislatively appointed regulatory bodies 
have institutional competence to address rate-making issues; 
(2) courts lack the competence to set . . . rates; and (3) the 
interference of courts in the rate-making process would 
subvert the authority of rate-setting bodies and undermine the 
regulatory regime.”  Sun City Taxpayers’ Assoc. v. Citizens 
Utils. Co., 45 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1995).  The 
“nondiscrimination strand” recognizes that “victorious 
plaintiffs would wind up paying less than non-suing 
ratepayers.”  Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 21.     
 
The policies underlying the filed rate doctrine are also 
reflected in Supreme Court precedent.  In Montana-Dakota 
Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., for example, 
the Court refused to grant relief to a petitioner who claimed 
that its predecessor company had paid unreasonably high 
electric rates to the respondent.  341 U.S. 246, 247-48 (1951).  
Addressing the issue of damages, the Court stated that “the 
problem is whether it is open to the courts to determine what 
the reasonable rates during the past should have been.”  Id. at 
251.  Although the Court did not explicitly mention the filed 
rate doctrine, it relied on the nonjusticiability principle to 
deny relief, concluding that “reduc[ing] the abstract concept 
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of reasonableness to concrete expression in dollars and cents 
is the function of the [Agency] Commission.”  Id. 
 
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., on the other hand, the 
Court relied heavily on the nondiscrimination strand to deny 
relief.  453 U.S. at 571.  There, the plaintiffs, natural gas 
producers, sued a customer to recover an unfiled gas rate 
under the parties’ purchase agreement.  Id. at 573-74.  The 
parties’ agreement contained a “favored nations clause,” 
which allowed the plaintiffs to charge the defendant at a rate 
higher than the filed rate if the defendant ever “purchased . . . 
gas from another party at a rate higher than the one it was 
paying [the plaintiffs].”  Id. at 573.  Relying on the filed rate 
doctrine, the Court recognized that “‘[t]he considerations 
underlying the doctrine . . . are preservation of the agency’s 
primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates and the need 
to insure that regulated companies charge only those rates of 
which the agency has been made cognizant.’”  Id. at 577-78 
(quoting City of Cleveland v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 525 F.2d 
845, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).  The Court denied plaintiffs’ 
requested relief, however, specifically because awarding 
damages based on “a rate never filed . . . and thus never found 
to be reasonable” would “undermine the congressional 
scheme of uniform rate regulation.”  Id. at 579.    
 
As a preliminary matter, Appellants argue that the 
District Court erred by concluding that “the mere filing and 
approval of rates with a regulating agency” triggers the filed 
rate doctrine.  Appellant’s Br. at 11.  According to 
Appellants, that approach is only proper where stare decisis 
requires the doctrine’s application to the regulatory scheme at 
issue.  See id. at 12-13.  Thus, before extending the doctrine 
to a “new regulatory context”—i.e., New Jersey title 
insurance—Appellants argue that the District Court should 
have determined whether the doctrine’s underlying policies 
are implicated.  Id. at 11-14.  Yet Appellants offer no 
authority showing that those policies are elements in 
determining whether to extend the doctrine to new areas.  The 
Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine applies 
whenever rates are properly filed with a regulating agency.  
Compare Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 422 (applying the 
doctrine to rates governed by the Interstate Commerce Act 
and noting that “Keogh simply held that an award of treble 
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damages is not an available remedy for a private shipper 
claiming that the rate submitted to, and approved by, the ICC 
was the product of an antitrust violation”), with Ark. La. Gas 
Co., 453 U.S. at 577 (extending the doctrine to rates governed 
by the Natural Gas Act because they were “properly filed 
with the appropriate federal regulatory authority”).  
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held that “the doctrine is 
applied strictly . . . whenever either the nondiscrimination 
strand or the nonjusticiability strand . . . is implicated.”  
Marcus, 138 F.3d at 59 (emphasis added). 
 
Appellants argue that this action does not implicate the 
nonjusticiability strand because it does “not second-guess any 
ratemaking determination made by the DOBI.”  Appellants’ 
Br. at 14.  They alleged in their complaint that the DOBI has 
neither “actively supervised the Defendants’ collective rate 
setting scheme” nor “subjected the Defendants to any analysis 
designed to determine whether [their] filed rates for title 
insurance and attendant services conformed to . . . statutory 
requirements.”  App. at 81.  Appellants therefore claim that 
the doctrine’s policy of deferring to agency rate-making 
expertise (i.e., nonjusticiability) is irrelevant because the 
DOBI did not exercise any “meaningful review” of the 
challenged rates.  See Appellants’ Br. at 15.   
 
 Appellees counter that the nonjusticiability strand is 
“actually . . . grounded in concerns about the institutional 
competence of federal courts to set rates,” not “the expertise 
of state regulatory agencies.”  Appellees’ Br. at 21-22.  Thus, 
they contend that the policy is applicable in this case because 
Appellants requested the District Court to award damages 
based on the rates that “would have been paid in the absence 
of . . . antitrust violations.”  Id. at 23 (quoting Am. Compl. at 
¶ 69, App. at 45).  Moreover, Appellees argue that Square D 
rejected the idea that the filed rate doctrine only applies if an 
agency conducts “meaningful review” of the challenged rates.  
Id. at 24.   
 
Appellants’ argument is meritless because the 
nonjusticiability strand recognizes that federal courts are ill-
equipped to engage in the rate making process, which does 
not depend on whether agencies actually use their superior 
expertise.  See, e.g., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 341 U.S. at 
11 
 
251 (finding that it is not “open to the courts to determine 
what the reasonable rates during the past should have been”);  
Sun City Taxpayers’ Assoc., 45 F.3d at 62 (“[C]ourts lack the 
competence to set utility rates. . . .”); Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d 
at 21 (“Courts are simply ill-suited to systematically second 
guess the regulators’ decisions and overlay their own 
resolution.”).  Indeed, Appellants argue that “[t]here is no 
reason a court cannot determine what [rates] the DOBI would 
have approved since it does nothing but rubber stamp rates 
filed by [Appellees]” but, at the same time, suggest that the 
District Court should have determined what the “competitive 
rates” would have been in order to award damages.  
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 9.  Therefore, even accepting 
Appellants’ logic, their antitrust claims would require the 
District Court to determine the reasonable rate absent the 
alleged conspiracy—“a function that . . . regulatory agencies 
are more competent to perform.”  Marcus, 138 F.3d at 58.  
Additionally, to the extent that the justiciability principle is 
aimed at “preserv[ing] . . . the agency’s primary jurisdiction 
over reasonableness of rates,” Hall, 453 U.S. at 577-78, the 
adjudication of Appellants’ complaint would intrude upon 
that jurisdiction because it challenges rates that the DOBI has 
already approved as “not unreasonably high . . . or unfairly 
discriminatory.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:46B-45(a).2
 
 
Appellants seek to reinforce their argument that the 
nonjusticiability strand is only implicated where agencies 
have meaningfully reviewed the challenged rate by relying on 
                                              
2 Although Appellants state in their complaint that the 
DOBI has not obtained the type of data necessary to 
determine whether Appellees’ title insurance rates 
“conformed to . . . statutory requirements,”  App. at 81, they 
nonetheless concede that the DOBI approved Appellees’ 
rates, see App. at 82.  Under New Jersey law, such approval 
necessarily requires a determination that the rates are “not 
unreasonably high, and are not inadequate for the safeness 
and soundness of the insurer, and are not unfairly 
discriminatory.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:46B-45(a); see also N.J. 
Builders Ass’n v. Sheeran, 402 A.2d 956, 961 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1979) (noting that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:46B-45 
evidently requires the DOBI Commissioner to conduct “some 
degree” of fact-finding). 
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Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).  
In that case, consumers alleged that various title insurance 
companies conspired to “fix price levels for title search and 
examination services.”  Id. at 387.  Although the insurers filed 
their rates with regulating agencies, the relevant statutory 
schemes required “only ‘non-disapproval’ of the rates” before 
they became effective “and d[id] not require compliance with 
strict guidelines.”  Id. at 394.  The court therefore observed 
that if the challenged rates “were the product of unlawful 
activity prior to their being filed and were not subjected to 
meaningful review by the state, then the fact that they were 
filed does not render them immune from challenge.”  Id.  
Furthermore, the court reasoned that “[t]he absence of 
meaningful state review allows the insurers to file any rates 
they want.”  Id.  Thus, it concluded that “the act of filing does 
not legitimize a rate arrived at by improper action” and 
refused to apply the filed rate doctrine.  Id. 
 
Appellants’ reliance on Brown is unpersuasive.  Brown 
adopts a particularly narrow and unprecedented view of the 
filed rate doctrine.  The regulatory schemes at issue in Brown 
also required only “non-disapproval” of the challenged rates, 
and it is unclear from the court’s opinion whether the 
regulating agencies had to conduct any review of the rates at 
all.  Here, by contrast, the DOBI affirmatively approved 
Appellees’ insurance rates and was legally required to do so 
before the rates became effective.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
17:46B-45(a).  Under New Jersey law, the DOBI is required 
to review filings to make sure they “produce rates that are not 
unreasonably high, . . . are not inadequate for the safeness and 
soundness of the insurer, and are not unfairly discriminatory.”  
Id.  Accordingly, even if Brown adopted a “meaningful 
review” standard for applying the doctrine, the DOBI would 
easily meet that requirement, as it: (1) affirmatively approved 
the challenged rates, and (2) was required to review the rates 
before issuing its approval.  Finally, given Appellants’ policy 
argument, their reliance on Brown seems misplaced because 
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion does not mention the 
nonjusticiability or nondiscrimination strands.    
 
The Supreme Court moreover has rejected the notion 
that agencies must “meaningfully review” rates under the 
filed rate doctrine.  In Square D, the petitioners argued that 
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the doctrine should not bar their antitrust claim because the 
ICC did not conduct a hearing before approving the disputed 
rates.  Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 417 n.19.  The Court, 
however, clarified that Keogh is not limited to situations 
where rates “‘had been investigated and approved by the 
ICC,’” but applied “‘whenever tariffs have been filed.’”  Id. 
(quoting Square D Co., 760 F.2d at 1351); see also Montana-
Dakota Utils. Co., 341 U.S. at 251 (holding that the petitioner 
“can claim no rate as a legal right . . . other than the filed rate, 
whether fixed or merely accepted by the [Agency] 
Commission”).  Similarly, other courts of appeals have held 
that the filed rate doctrine does not require “meaningful” 
agency review.  Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 
390, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that the 
doctrine should not apply if reviewing agencies “rarely 
exercise their muscle and thus give no meaningful review to 
the rate structure”); Town of Norwood v. New Eng. Power 
Co., 202 F.3d 408, 419 (1st Cir. 2000) (“It is the filing of the 
tariffs, and not any affirmative approval or scrutiny by the 
agency, that triggers the filed rate doctrine.”).  Accordingly, 
the nonjusticiability strand fully supports the District Court’s 
application of the filed rate doctrine in this case.    
 
Appellants claim that their action does not implicate 
the doctrine’s nondiscrimination strand because it “has been 
brought on behalf of all those similarly situated to the named 
Plaintiffs, thus eliminating any discrimination issues.”  
Appellants’ Br. at 17.  Appellees, on the other hand, argue 
that the nondiscrimination policy is relevant because “not 
every [title insurance] purchaser will necessarily become a 
member of the class or obtain recovery,” and “some class 
members may opt out, while others may fail to receive actual 
notice or may be excluded from the class.”  Appellees’ Br. at 
28. 
 
Various courts have recognized that class-actions 
reduce discrimination concerns.  In Square D, for instance, 
the Supreme Court indicated that “the development of class 
actions . . . might alleviate the . . . concern about unfair 
rebates” and seems to undermine some of the reasoning 
supporting the filed rate doctrine.  476 U.S. at 423.  Similarly, 
the Second Circuit has noted that “concerns for 
discrimination are substantially alleviated in [a] putative class 
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action.”  Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 22.  Thus, Appellants are 
correct that their action does not clearly impact the doctrine’s 
nondiscrimination strand.  However, we hold that the 
nonjusticiability policy alone warrants the doctrine’s 
application to Appellants’ treble damages Sherman Act and 
New Jersey Antitrust Act claims.3
 
  See Marcus, 138 F.3d at 
59 (noting that the doctrine applies strictly “whenever either 
the nondiscrimination strand or the nonjusticiability strand . . 
. is implicated”).  
This result is also appropriate under New Jersey law.  
See Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 
701 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Federal courts that decide state law 
claims are required to apply the substantive law of the state 
whose laws govern the action.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)); see also Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft 
Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying 
state law in rejecting application of the filed rate doctrine to 
cases involving rates set by state agencies).   
 
Appellants argue that New Jersey precedent, 
particularly Richardson v. Standard Guaranty Ins. Co., 853 
A.2d 955 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), does not support 
the doctrine’s application to their New Jersey Antitrust Act 
claim.  In Richardson, the plaintiff alleged that the sales 
practices of various credit card and insurance companies 
fraudulently induced her to purchase several insurance 
policies.  Id. at 961.  The court held that the plaintiff’s 
action—which alleged, inter alia, that the defendants had 
“unfairly or inaccurately calculated premiums”—was barred 
by the filed rate doctrine.  Id.  As Appellants point out, the 
court indicated that the “under-enforcement of ratemaking 
regulations may constitute a basis for a less rigorous 
application of the filed rate doctrine.”  Id. at 964.  The court, 
however, emphasized that the statutory framework at issue 
required the rate regulator (the DOBI) to “examine [rate] 
filings for their fairness and their ability to disclose terms 
                                              
3 It is well established that the filed rate doctrine can 
serve as a defense against both federal and state actions.  See, 
e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 
214, 228 (1998) (holding that the “respondent’s state-law 
claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine”). 
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relevant to consumers.”  Id.  Thus, the court ultimately 
concluded that “the filed rate doctrine should be applied.”  Id. 
at 965.  
 
Relying on Richardson, Appellants argue that the filed 
rate doctrine should not bar their state claim because New 
Jersey’s title insurance regulations are under-enforced.  More 
specifically, they claim that “the DOBI has not enacted a 
single regulation [governing title insurance], despite a 
Legislative mandate to do so.”  Appellants’ Br. at 43-44.  
Even assuming those allegations to be true, Appellants’ 
argument is unpersuasive.  In particular, the regulations in 
Richardson required credit insurers to file policy rates with 
the DOBI and required the Commissioner to review those 
rates for excessiveness.  853 A.2d at 964.  A similar 
regulatory scheme is present here, since insurers must file 
their rates with the DOBI, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:46B-42(a), 
and the DOBI must review those rates to ensure that they are 
not “unreasonably high” or “unfairly discriminatory,” see id. 
§ 17:46B-45(a).  Accordingly, state law does not preclude the 
doctrine’s application to Appellants’ New Jersey Antitrust 
Act claim.4
 
   
B. Standing to Sue 
 
Appellants contend that the District Court erred by 
dismissing their injunctive relief claims5
                                              
4  Appellants also argue that “the filed rate doctrine has 
been the subject of sustained criticism by the [New Jersey] 
courts and has never been applied to the New Jersey title 
insurance regulatory regime.”  Appellants’ Br. at 40.  
However, as the District Court correctly noted, New Jersey 
courts have recently affirmed the vitality of the filed rate 
doctrine.  See, e.g., Richardson, 853 A.2d at 963 (“[T]he 
doctrine maintains a substantial role in administrative 
ratemaking . . . .”). 
 under Article III of 
 
5 Appellants sought, inter alia, a “final injunction . . . 
enjoining Defendants from engaging in collective rate setting 
with regard to all future title insurance rate filings with the 
Department of Insurance.”  App. at 86. 
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the Constitution and Section 16 of the Clayton Act for lack of 
standing.6
 
  “Section 16 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes 
injunctive relief in private antitrust cases, focuses on 
‘threatened loss or damage’ resulting from a violation of the 
antitrust laws, and it authorizes an injunction when and under 
the same conditions as injunctions are granted by ‘courts of 
equity.’”  Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 829 (3d Cir. 
1984) (footnote and citations omitted).  To establish standing 
under Section 16, Appellants must “demonstrate a significant 
threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust 
laws or from a contemporary violation likely to continue or 
recur.”  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 
U.S. 100, 130 (1969).  Similarly, to establish Article III 
standing, Appellants must show: “(1) injury-in-fact, which is 
an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete 
and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury 
and the conduct complained of; and (3) it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”  Danvers Motor Co., Inc. 
v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 Appellants argue that they have standing to pursue 
their Sherman Act and New Jersey Antitrust Act injunctive 
relief claims because Appellees’ “collusion has deprived, and 
will continue to deprive [them] of the benefits of free, open 
and unrestricted competition” in the title insurance market.  
Appellants’ Br. at 31-32.  Further, Appellants argue that their 
injuries are imminent and thus confer standing because: (1) 
New Jersey requires Appellees to file any new rates with the 
DOBI; and (2) “people who have already purchased real 
estate are most likely to do so again and . . . homeowners, on 
average, change residence every seven years.”7
                                              
6 As the District Court recognized, the filed rate 
doctrine does not bar injunctive relief claims against future 
rates.  See Square D. Co., 476 U.S. at 422 & n.28 (noting that 
the filed rate doctrine specifically precludes antitrust claims 
for treble damages). 
  Id. at 36.  
 
7 Appellants must establish standing based on future 
harm, since their previous title insurance purchases do not 
constitute a continuing injury.  As the District Court held, the 
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Appellees, on the other hand, argue that Appellants lack 
standing because they have not alleged that “any new rate 
submission to the DOBI by NJLTIRB is imminent, [or] that 
any particular Plaintiff will purchase title insurance in the 
future.”  Appellees’ Br. at 46.       
 
Appellants do not have standing because they have 
failed to allege any impending injury.  In their complaint, 
Appellants alleged that:  
 
(a) price competition in the sale of title 
insurance and attendant services has been and 
will be suppressed, restrained and eliminated; 
 
(b) prices for title insurance and attendant 
services have been and will be raised, fixed, 
maintained and stabilized at artificially high and 
non-competitive levels; and, 
 
(c) purchasers of title insurance have been 
and will be deprived of the benefit of free and 
open competition. 
 
App. at 85.  However, as the District Court correctly 
observed, Appellants did not allege that Appellees have 
collectively “filed new proposed insurance rates” or “intend 
to do so in the near future.”  In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 2010 
WL 2710570, at *6.  Additionally, Appellants did not assert 
                                                                                                     
existing rates do not constitute a cognizable legal injury under 
the filed rate doctrine.  Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163 (stating that 
“[u]nless and until suspended or set aside, th[e filed] rate is 
made, for all purposes, the legal rate”); see also Wegoland 
Ltd., 27 F.3d at 18  (“[T]he doctrine holds that any ‘filed rate’ 
. . . is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial 
proceedings brought by ratepayers.”).  Thus, Appellants must 
establish standing based on the possibility of future unfair 
rates.  See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their 
Application ¶ 247d (3d ed. 2006) (“[T]here is no reason to 
think Keogh would prohibit an injunction against an antitrust 
violation attending some tariff that would or might be filed in 
the future.  Such a tariff has not been ‘filed’ at all.”). 
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that they intend to re-purchase title insurance.  Although they 
emphasize that New Jersey law requires insurers to file new 
rates with the DOBI, that mandate does not make their claims 
any less speculative because it does not indicate when 
Appellees will file new rates.  Likewise, Appellants’ claim 
that home owners generally relocate every seven years does 
not show that any Appellant plans to buy title insurance in the 
future, thus failing to raise their claims above the speculative 
level.  Therefore, Appellants have neither established “actual 
or imminent” injury-in-fact under Article III, Danvers Motor 
Co., 432 F.3d at 291, nor an “impending violation of the 
antitrust laws” under the Clayton Act.8
 
  Zenith Radio Corp., 
395 U.S. at 130.  
C.  Dismissal with Prejudice 
 
 Finally, Appellants argue that if they lack standing, we 
must hold that the District Court abused its discretion by 
denying them leave to amend their complaint and “substitute 
an appropriate plaintiff.”  Appellants’ Br. at 37-38.  Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that courts “should 
freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”  
Further, this court has “held that even when a plaintiff does 
not seek leave to amend, if a complaint is vulnerable to 
12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court must permit a curative 
amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or 
futile.”  Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).   
 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying Appellants leave to amend their complaint.  
Appellants lack standing to assert their injunctive relief 
claims specifically because there is no imminent threat that 
the NJTIRB will file future rates.  Thus, even if Appellants 
substituted a plaintiff with concrete plans to purchase title 
insurance, s/he would still lack standing—thus making the 
                                              
8 Because Appellants lack standing to pursue their 
claims, we will not reach their arguments that the District 
Court erred by concluding that Appellants’ injunctive relief 
claims are barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 56:9-5(b)(4) antitrust liability exemptions.   
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amendment of Appellants’ complaint futile.9
 
  The District 
Court therefore did not abuse its discretion by dismissing 
Appellants’ action with prejudice. 
III. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s orders.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
9 Although the District Court dismissed Appellants’ 
complaint with prejudice because “the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:9-5(b)(4) bar [Appellants’] 
federal and state antitrust claims,” In re N.J. Title Ins. Litig., 
2010 WL 2710570, at *12, we may affirm the District Court’s 
decision on different grounds.  See Morse v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 904 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997).    
